Taxation transfer pricing law in Malaysia: Salient legal issues by Md Dahlan, Nuarrual Hilal et al.
International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology 
Vol. 29, No. 6s, (2020), pp. 1688-1703 
 
1688 ISSN: 2005-4238 IJAST  
Copyright ⓒ 2020 SERSC 
 
 
TAXATION TRANSFER PRICING LAW IN MALAYSIA:SALIENT 
LEGAL ISSUES 
 
Nuarrual Hilal Md Dahlan, Professor of Law, School of Law, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Kedah, 
Malaysia 
Abu Tariq Jamaluddin, Director, Legal Department, Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia 





Globalisation and rapid growth of international trade have made intercompany pricing a common 
consideration for vast majority of businesses. Transfer pricing is not in itself illegal or abusive. What is 
illegal or abusive is transfer mispricing, also known as transfer pricing manipulation or abusive transfer 
pricing. Generally, related parties are required to transact on terms which might reasonably be expected 
to have been made by independent parties engaged in the same or similar transaction at arm’s length. 
The allocation of profits among different parts of the multinational enterprise (MNE) operating in 
different jurisdictions is dependent on the outcome of its transfer pricing strategy. It can decide how much 
tax an MNE pays and to which authorities. To curb manipulation and abuse of transfer pricing, the 
Government of Malaysia like any other tax jurisdictions, introduced transfer pricing guidelines and 
law.The first guideline on transfer pricing was published in 2003 by the Inland Revenue Board of 
Malaysia. Consequently, in 2009, specific transfer pricing provisions were inserted into the Income Tax 
Act 1967 (ITA). Under the new provision, the Director-General of Inland Revenue (DGIR) is empowered 
to substitute the price of any transactions entered into by related persons to reflect the arm’s length price 
of such transaction. The objective of the research writing is to study the legal issues arising from the 
transfer pricing law in Malaysia. The authors find that imposition of penalty is one of the most prevalent 
issue resulting from transfer pricing adjustment. It is an accepted tax principle that a taxpayer is entitled 
to plan his affairs to pay less amount of tax as it otherwise would be. A taxpayer has always been free to 
mitigate his tax liability. This research writing usedqualitative case study and legal research 
methodologies to discuss and analysis the law and the legal issues of the subject matter. For this purpose, 
the authors focused on two transfer pricing adjustment cases. An examination was also carried out on the 
notices of appeal filed by the taxpayers to the Special Commissioners of Income Tax.The ultimate goal is 
to minimise manipulation and abuse of transfer pricing in the related parties transaction. The research 
aspires to contribute towards the implementation of a comprehensive transfer pricing law in Malaysia.  
 




Globalisation and the rapid growth of international trade has made intercompany pricing a common 
consideration for the vast majority of businesses. Transfer pricing is not in itself illegal or abusive 
(Borkowski, 2007). What is illegal or abusive is mispricing resulting in transfer pricing manipulation or 
abusive transfer pricing (Sebastian & Jan, 2015). Principally related parties are required to transact on 
terms which might fairly be expected to have been made by independent parties engaged in the same or 
similar transaction at arm’s length (Holtzman& Nagel, 2014). 
 
In Malaysia, the first guidelines on transfer pricing were issued by the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia 
(IRBM)in 2003 (Guideline2003).  The guidelines were published based on the general anti-avoidance 
provisionof section 140 of the Income Tax Act 1967 (ITA). Under section 140,the Director-General of 
Inland Revenue (DGIR) may disregard or vary any transaction between persons,one of whom has control 
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over the other,if he has reason to believe that the transaction was not done at arm’s length. A number of 
transfer pricing adjustments were disputed with appeals filed before the Special Commissioners of 
Income Tax (‘SCIT’). Currently, there are three cases decided by the SCIT where the tax adjustment was 
set aside and ruled to be wrong in law (MM SdnBhd v KetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri, 2013, OMSB v 
KetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri, 2012 and PGSB v. KetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri, 2013). Though 
there weresome reasonsstated in the ruling made by the SCIT, the most critical reason is thatthe Revenue 
is not authorised to make transfer pricing adjustment under the law.The SCIT was of the opinion that the 
general anti-avoidance provision was not intended to be applied for transfer pricing cases. Therefore,any 
ambiguity shall be construed in favour of the taxpayer.In addition, Guidelines 2003 has no force of law as 
there was no enabling provision for the Revenue to issue the Guidelines (MM SdnBhd v 
KetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri, 2013). 
 
It is without a doubt that the ruling made by the SCIT hada verysignificant impact on Inland Revenue 
Board of Malaysia (‘IRBM’), in particular, when audit activity involves transfer pricing 
adjustment.Furthermoreevery year substantial payments are made by a company taxable in Malaysia to its 
related entities located in other tax jurisdictions. Based onreturn forms furnished to IRBM for the years of 
assessment 2010 to 2017, the volume of control transactions and amount of paymentsinvolved are very 
significant. Table 1 provides the data on the number of taxpayers and the amount of payments made for 
each particular year of assessment. 
 
Table 1: The Amount of Payment Made and Received By Related Parties Transaction from 2010 to 
2017 
Source:  Tax Operations Department, IRBM 
 
In 2009, the IRBM set up a Multinational Tax Department (MTD) to deal with transfer pricing issues.The 
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in the number of transfer pricing cases, a new Multinational Tax Branch (MTB) was set up in place of the 
Department. Themain task of the department or branch is to auditmultinational companies to ensure that 
the arm’s length principle is observed.The amount of tax and penalty recovered from transfer pricing 
audit activities between the periods of 2004 – 2018were quite substantial by taking into consideration the 
strength of the Department. Table 2 details the outcome of the audit for those periods. 
 
Table 2 - Amounts of Tax Payable Arising from Transfer Pricing Audit in 2004 to 2018 
 
Year Additional tax (RM) 
Penalty      
(RM) 
Total Amount  
(RM) 
2004 24,579,529 2,432,370 27,011,899 
2005 47,216,212 28,070,656 72,286,868 
2006 73,385,623 18,600,308 91,985,931 
2007 59,903,353 11,436,656 71,340,009 
2008 40,191,247 6,921,183 47,112,430 
2009 26,270,487 7,469,424 33,739,911 
2010 90,137,793 27,853,992 55,096,075 
2011 40,278,097 6,726,005 47,004,102 
2012 90,137,793 27,853,992 117,991,785 
2013 123,199,748 42,800,629 166,000,377 
2014 117,487,828 38,455,479 155,943,307 
2015 103,462,733 21,407,454 124,870,186 
2016 194,405,673 46,034,914 240,440,586 
2017 477,775,200 186,481,024 681,939,667 
2018 432,867,821 149,694,311 582,562,134 
Source: Multinational Tax Branch, IRBM 
 
MTBwas established as a consequence oftheintroduction ofaspecific transfer pricing provision in the ITA. 
Malaysiawas one of the last countries in the world to introduce aspecific law to address transfer pricing 
issues (Lohse, Riede&Spenge, 2012). The United States of America was the pioneer country to develop 
and adopt regulations on transfer pricing based on the arm’s length principle (Koomen, 2015). These 
footsteps were followed byother countries such as Australia, Japan, Germany, Italy and 
Indonesia(Theresa et al., 2012). The new section 140A of the ITA requires a taxpayer to determine the 
arm’s length price on its related transaction.  Arm’s length prices arenot defined under the ITA. However, 
the manner or method on how the arm’s length price should be determined isprovided in the Income Tax 
(Transfer Pricing) Rules 2012(TP Rules 2012).The IRBM published a new Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
(Guidelines 2012) to clarify the application of the new law and Rules. The guidelines are largely based on 
the governing standard for transfer pricing which is the arm’s length principle as set out in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD 
TP Guidelines). 
 
For the purpose of this article, an overview of the objective, literature review, the methodology and the 
emergence of problems in the implementation of these transfer pricing rules are touchedupon. Emphasis 
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This research writing aims to achieve the following objectives: 
 
1) To study the law of taxation transfer pricing in Malaysia; 
2) To study the legal issues of taxation transfer pricing in Malaysia; 




The research questions of this research writing are as follows: 
 
1) What are the taxation transfer pricing law in Malaysia? 
2) What are the legal issues in the taxation transfer pricing in Malaysia? 
3) How and why the legal issues exist? 
4) How to deal with the legal issues? 
5) What are the recommendations to improve the taxation transfer pricing law in Malaysia? 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON TAXATION TRANSFER PRICING 
 
Transfer pricing law and its regulations have been researched extensively concerning this study and 
appended below are some of the said investigations.  
 
Chan’sinvestigation hinges on whether transfer pricing regulation introduced by the governmentleads to 
the choices of international transfer prices (Chan, 2011). His finding is that companies make decision in 
the direction of improving overall corporate profits. This finding supportsan earlier study that laws on 
transfer pricing do affect the making of decisionsin respect of transfer pricing. To curb manipulation, 
Chan had suggested that government should consider introducing penalties and regulations. 
 
Bhat(2009) reiterated that it is the governments’ responsibility to collect taxes, and there is a need to enact 
legislation to ensure equitable distribution of tax burdens. He depicts that tax-motivated transfer pricing 
has attracted worldwide attention due to low tax haven jurisdictions and the volume of multinational 
corporation activities. Multinational corporations can shift profits via transfer pricing through tax haven 
countries. Governments designed the implementation of arm’s length principles and formulation 
apportionments, in most cases, to regulate transfer pricing manipulations. Bhat’srecommendation is for 
the establishment of a global institution to calculate the worldwide income of MNEs and provide tax 
authorities with timely information. 
 
Adams and Drtina’s studies (2010) lead to the discovery that in 1994, onlythe United States and Australia 
enacted transfer pricing legislation. However, the numbers have significantly increased and as a result in 
2009, at least 49 countries, including most countries in the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD), have passed transfer-pricing legislation. Adams and Drtina indicated that the 
increase in the adaptation of transfer pricing legislation could be attributable to multinational 
corporations’ strategies to shift profits to lower tax jurisdictions. Most of the tax authorities of these 
countries adopted the arm’s length standard as a measure to mitigate transfer pricing manipulations. 
Adams and Drtina also highlighted the need for periodic studies to measure the effectiveness of transfer 
pricing regulations enacted to regulate transfer-pricing manipulations. 
 
Lohse, Riedel &Spengel(2010) examined 44 countries in the world and studied the development of 
different aspects of transfer pricing regulations over nine years through comparison between the countries 
International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology 
Vol. 29, No. 6s, (2020), pp. 1688-1703 
 
1692 ISSN: 2005-4238 IJAST  
Copyright ⓒ 2020 SERSC 
 
 
in the region. The assumption on the existence of transfer pricing regulation is the adoption of arm’s 
length principles, the consideration of related party or control transaction, methods or documentation are 
included in the domestic tax law. Their findings as of2009 show that only seven countries do not have 
transfer pricing regulations introduced in their tax laws.  The said countries are Austria, Ireland, 
Luxemburg, Philippines, Switzerland, Thailand and Malaysia. It was concluded that those countries 
might, in some way, benefited from the non-arms’ length transaction. Lohse, Riedel and Spengelfound 
that majority of countries apply their transfer pricing regulation to domestic and foreign-related parties. 
Developed and high tax countries tend to restrict the application of the regulation to foreign-related 
entities. The study also revealed that not all countries have statutory documentation requirements, and the 
imposition of penalty varies from country to country. The key elements of transfer pricing that are 
categorised into six categories become the basis in evaluating transfer pricing regulation in each category 
strictly. The lowest category is when there is no anti-avoidance rule or no transfer pricing regulation 
applied or introduced in the country, while the highest category is where a country applies the arm’s 
length principle and has documentation requirement in the law and a long disclosure of documentation. It 
was discovered that only 32% of countries in Europe fall under the highest category as compared to 80% 
of countries outside Europe. In Malaysia, with the introduction of specific law and rules on 
documentation in the year 2009 and 2012 respectively, based on the study, it could be concluded that 
Malaysia falls into the highest category. 
 
Lohse and Riedel (2013), in another study, examined the impact of transfer pricing documentation laws 
on international profit shifting behaviour. They collected data on transfer pricing regulations from 26 
European countries over the past ten years and linked the data with the panel data on multinational firms 
in Europe. They found that profit shifting activities have reduced significantly in the countries that have 
introduced transfer pricing documentation regulation.The result shows around 50% reduction with stricter 
rules induces stronger declines in shifting behaviour. The imposition of penalties further leads toadecrease 
in profit shifting activities. 
 
Feleaga&Neacsu(2016) analysed whether the adoption of legislation in particular documentation 
requirement can reduce the problem of erosion and profit shifting. Their study focused on OECD member 
countries.They identified the budget revenue obtained from corporate income tax in the sample country 
and also the share of the budget revenue with the GDP.  The result in the year before and after the 
introduction of transfer pricing documentation regulation have been compared.They found that budget 
revenue derived from corporate income tax shows positive result during the period between the year 
before adoption and the year of adoption.They then concluded that regulation indeed discourages 
multinationals from shifting profit from high to low tax jurisdiction. 
 
Malaysia’s transfer pricing law is indeed consistent with the new and rapid development adopted by other 
countries concerning transfer pricing activities. In Turkey, ZekiGurduz(2009) examined the new transfer 
pricing legislationthat came into effect in 2007. The new legislation replaces the old provision, which was 
vague and did not specify testing methodology regarding benchmark; hence, most cases brought to court 
were rejected due to lack of benchmark.  The new legislation follows OECD guidelines strictly, 
introduces transfer pricing guidelines and documentation requirement. 
 
In Spain, Garrigus’sfinding is that the new changes in transfer pricing rules are in respect of the burden of 
proof where it is shifted to the taxpayer. The new law provides for new documentation requirement and 
accepted all OECD valuation methods. The new law also provides penalties provision and highlights the 
application of specific OECD guidelines (Garrigus, 2005). 
 
In Russia, it wasobserved that the transfer pricing legislation which was introduced in 1999 is not an 
efficient tool to deal with transfer pricing issues. The proposed amendments focus on the area of safe 
harbour, imposition of penalties, documentation requirement and burden of proof 
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(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007).Nicolas Jacquotreported that France would introduce new legislation on 
the requirement of submitting transfer pricing documentation and imposition of penalty (Nicolas, 2009). 
 
The obvious characteristic of the studies reviewed acknowledges that transferpricing manipulations are 
indeed a serious problem to all governments in the world. The studies by Lohse and Riedel (2013), and 
Feleaga and Neacsu (2016) confirmed the effectiveness of transfer pricing documentation and penalty to 




The authorsexaminedtwotransfer pricing audit cases where the adjustments and the assessmentsmade by 
the IRBM were disputed and appealed to the Special Commissioners of Income Tax. The legal scope 
involvesprinciples ofrevenue law, the Federal Constitution and administrative law. Besides, the legal 
framework and legal approaches in the UK and Australia are also considered in the context of transfer 
pricing cases. The purpose of this comparative study is to learn and adopt an appropriate approach to 
formulating a comprehensive legal provision to deal with transfer pricing issues.  
 
The qualitative case study and legal research methodologies in carrying out the purported research have 
been adopted by the researcher. Qualitative case study isused toanalyse data and information acquired 
from two transfer pricing audit cases carried out by the IRBM. The reason as to why qualitative is chosen 
rather than quantitative research methodology is because qualitative allows more access to details, getting 
a more intensive andin-depth study, problems, issues, legal phenomena and legal problems of transfer 
pricing in the two cases (Silverman, 2000). 
 
This writing is also an outcome of finding done through a legal doctrinal research. This type of research 
concerns the discovery and development of legal doctrines. Legal doctrine is a hermeneutic discipline. In 
hermeneutic discipline, texts and document are the main research objects and their interpretation, 
according to standard methods, is the main activity of the researchers. It is research writing about law 
rather than research writing in law. The aim, in each case, is to answer the question “What is the law?’ in 
a particular situation (McConville& Wing 2007).This research also states the rules, principles of the law 
and decided cases involving transfer pricing. The possible outcome is the determination of the clarity and 
unambiguity of the existing legislation beingsection 140A of the ITA.  
 
The research activities include the discovery of the principles, rules and case law to explain and resolve 
the issues, objectives and research questions. The sources are from the traditional legal authorities on 
revenue/taxation lawand other branches of the law that have central and peripheral relevance to the topic 
under study like parliamentary debates, guidelines, practice notes, internal ruling etc. 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
This research paper examines issues arising from the implementation of taxation transfer pricing 
provisions in Malaysia. The issues were identified from the two case studies involving two companies 
that have been audited by IRBM.Also, grounds of appeal filed by the taxpayer who is aggrieved by the 
assessments raised by the DGIR as a result of a transfer pricing adjustment is also examined. The 
summaryof the facts and issues found in respect of the twocase studies and the finding on the grounds of 
appeal from 40 notices of appeal filed against transfer pricing adjustments are as follow: 
 
Case study 1 
 
Case Study 1 examines a company selected for audit by the IRBM prior to the year 2009. It is pertinent to 
note that prior to 2009, there was no specific provision in the ITAfor transfer pricing issues. As 
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such,IRBM relied on section 140 of ITA, beingthe general anti-avoidance provision. Due to the 
confidentiality provision (Section 138, ITA), the taxpayer who was audited will be referred to 
as‘Company One’. Company Oneis an international strategy and general management consulting firm 
advising clients in most global markets and industries.  
 
IRBM selected Company One for transfer pricing audit due to two crucial reasons. Upon an examination 
of the initial risk of Company One,IRBM discovered that Company One was in a continuous loss position 
from 2003 to 2006 as gathered from aninitial examination of the profit and loss account of Company One. 
The second reason for the commencement of audit on Company One is the fact that the company had a 
significant related party transaction (IRBM Audit Report 2012). 
 
From the IRBM Audit Report (2012) Company One had filed a transfer pricing documentation where the 
result of the analysis showed that arm’s length related parties transaction. To benchmark the arm’s-length 
rate for its related party services, Company One had applied the Transaction Net Margin Method 
(TNMM). The related party services are corporate labour, worldwide IT projects and regional 
administration.Using the similar method of TNMM, the IRBM has taken the median of the benchmarking 
result. The approach of the IRBM has resulted in additional assessments for the year assessment 2003 to 
2007.  
 
Disagreeing with the assessment, Company One filed an appeal on the ground that the full deduction on 
all expenses incurred are revenue expenditure and form an integral part of the company’s profit-making 
process. Besides, Company One submitted that the assessment for the years of assessment 2003 to 2005 is 
time-barred, fatally flawed and defective. As the assessment raised was based on TP Guidelines, 
2003which do not have legal effect; thus, the imposition of tax based on the TP Guidelines 2003 is 
unlawful. Additionally, the assessment is not valid because the IRBM has raised the assessment under 
section 140 of ITA but has not furnished particulars of the adjustment as required under subsection (5) of 
the said section. The IRBM has failed to prove that Company One was involved in any tax evasion;thus 
IRBM cannot raise the assessment under section 140 of the ITA.  
 
On the imposition of penalty, it was argued that subsection 113(2) of ITA  is not a strict liability 
provision, and the DGIR cannot impose penalty on Company One as the DGIR has failed to prove that 
Company One has acted in bad faith and that it is unreasonable for the imposition of such penalty based 
on the facts of the case.The audit adjustment was due toa different interpretation of the arm’s length 
principle between IRBM and Company One, and it cannot be assumed that the taxpayer has filed an 
incorrect return or given incorrect information. As such, there is no basis for the imposition of penalty. 
Therefore, the DGIR does not have the power to raise any assessment in this case, and such assessment is 
void and invalid. 
 
(b) Case Study2 
 
Case study two focuses on the transfer pricing audit case conducted by the IRBM post-2009.  It is 
pertinent to note that the first new and specific transfer pricing provision was introduced in that year. The 
new section 140A of ITAenacted by Parliament took effect from year of assessment 2009 and subsequent 
years of assessment.  Subsequent to the introduction of the new provision, a transfer pricing rules were 
issued by the Minister of Finance in 2012 (Section 154 of ITA). It was followed with a new transfer 
pricing guidelines (Guidelines 2012) to substitute the earlier Guidelines 2003. Due to the confidentiality 
provision (Section 138 of ITA), the audited taxpayer will be referred to as Company Two. From the TP 
Document of Company two, at page 24, Company Two’s business in Malaysia began in 1989 in the 
capacity as a representative office. Company Two is principally engaged in the trading of plastic resins, 
semiconductor and electronic components.The company procures trading merchandise from both related and 
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third parties. The Company then sells the merchandise to third parties as well as affiliates.These constitute 
approximately 97 percent of the total revenue of the Company. 
 
Company Two was selected for transfer pricing audit due to the downtrend ofthe gross profit margin of 
the company for the period of 2006 to 2010. The company’s net profit margin was also very low in the 
year 2009 and 2010 as opposedto prior years of 2006 and 2010.Observation from the  IRBM audit shows 
that Company Two purchases approximately half of its total trading merchandise from companies within the 
Group for the financial year (FY) 2009. Majority of the trading merchandise purchased relates to industrial 
materials.During FY 2006-2009, Company Two’s related party purchases are mainly from companies within 
the Group based in Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong. 
 
Initially, Company Two applieda cost plus method in ascertaining its arm’s length transaction since the 
method can be reliably performed to demonstrate the arm’s length nature of its related purchases and sales 
transaction. The alternatives method presented to the IRBM is TNMM where 6 companies were chosen as 
comparables. Based on the benchmarking result for 2009 to 2011, the operating profit margin of 
Company Two lies above the median of the interquartile range for each of the three years under study. 
IRBM’s audit team had in the course of the audit applied TNMM, however,in doing so,IRBM hadrejected 
two comparable companies that were used by Company Two andhad added three new companies as 
comparable. The approach taken by IRBM had resulted in an additional assessment and penalty to be paid 
by Company Two as the operating profit margin of Company Two is lower than the median of the 
benchmarking result. 
 
Aggrievedwith the assessment raised, Company Two filed an appeal on the ground that IRBM’s selective 
selection of “comparable” and adjustments are without legal basis and contrary to proper transfer pricing 
principles. It was contended that IRBM has erred in not applying the Cost Plus Method submitted by 
Company Two as the method provides the most reliable measures of arm’s length result. Company Two 
further argued that IRBM’s had failed to apply the arm’s length inter-quartile range in its proper context.  
Thedecision to make adjustments to the median are unreasonable, incorrect and without legal 
justification. 
 
The penalty imposed by IRBM is also subject to an appeal. Company Two alleged that IRBM   has 
wrongly imposed the penalty and does not have absolute discretion in law but must have due 
consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances. Subsection 113(2) of ITA is not a strict liability 
provision and IRBM failed to show that Company Two had acted in bad faith. It was contended thatthe 
transfer pricing adjustments essentially arose due to the difference between Company Two and the 
IRBM’sinterpretation as to what constitutes “arm’s length” and thus cannot be regarded as resulting in an 
incorrect return being filed or incorrect information given by Company Two to IRBM. 
 
Grounds of appeal (Form Q) 
 
The authorshaveexamined 40 notices of appeal filed against additional assessments or penalties imposed 
as a result of transfer pricing audits. Among the common issues are failure on the part of IRBM to 
understand or consider the prevailing commercial and economic condition of the taxpayer, arbitrary 
application of median range, rejection of comparable, failure to apply the right profit level indicator, 
failure to observe  natural justice, time-barred assessment and failure to provide reasons or analysis for 






International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology 
Vol. 29, No. 6s, (2020), pp. 1688-1703 
 
1696 ISSN: 2005-4238 IJAST  
Copyright ⓒ 2020 SERSC 
 
 
Table 5- Grounds of Appeal in Respect of Assessments Raised from 2009 to 2018 
No Grounds of Appeals Number of Appeals 
1 Disregard prevailing commercial reason 21 
2 Failure to make appropriate adjustment 9 
3 Arbitrarily apply median 21 
4 Wrongly apply the profit level indicator 7 
5 Inappropriately imposing penalty 37 
6 Rejection of comparable 16 
7 Failure to adopt a weighted average 14 
8 Disagreement on method 6 
9 




Source: Tax Litigation Division, Legal Department, IRBM. 
 
A majority of the grounds of appeal,i.e. 37 out of 40 appealcases,were disagreements or grievances on the 
imposition of penalties pursuant to transfer pricing adjustments. Another noticeable ground of appeal 
involving 21 cases, is the failure of the IRBM to regard the prevailing commercial and economic 
condition of the taxpayer while making a transfer pricing adjustment.The same number of appeals were in 
respect of arbitrary application of median range by the IRBM in ascertaining whether or not the tax 
payer’s transaction is at arm’s length. Based on the finding it is clear that the issue of imposition of 
penalty requires a detailed examination as to why it becomes the most pertinent ground of appeal and how 
the implementation of penalties in transfer pricing case could be done in a clear, consistent and fair 
manner.  
 
Imposition Of Penalty In Transfer Pricing Cases 
 
Impositions of penalties due to audit adjustment in tax cases are indeed common in all tax jurisdictions. In 
Malaysia, the penalty rate for transfer pricing adjustment is 35% where there is no contemporaneous 
transfer pricing documentation and 25% in the case where the document is prepared not according to the 
requirements of the guidelines (Guidelines, 2012). Presently, there is no special penalty provision which 
is applicable for transfer pricing adjustments. To date, a penalty is imposed under subsection 113(2) of 
ITA on the basis that the taxpayer has provided incorrect information or return that leads to an 
understatement of income. It is a general penalty provision applicable to all other audit finding cases. The 
rate of penalty shall not be more than double the amount of the tax or additional tax to be paid 
(Subsection 113(2) of ITA). 
 
Where pursuant to an audit, the IRBM has reason to believe that the taxpayer has paid no tax or sufficient 
tax, an assessment or additional assessment will be issued against the taxpayer (subsection 91(1) of ITA). 
A notice of assessment will be served (Section 145 of ITA) on the taxpayer and upon service of the said 
notice, the taxamount becomes due and payable (Subsection 103(1) of ITA). The taxpayer has 30 days to 
pay the amount payable failing which an increase of 10 per cent of the amount unpaid will be imposed 
(Subsection 103(2) of ITA). If there is no payment after 60 days following the end of the 30 days period, 
a further increase of 5 per cent of the unpaid amount will be collected from the taxpayer 
(Subsection103(5) of ITA). Notwithstanding that the taxpayer is appealing against the assessment, the tax 
has to be paid (Sun Man Tobacco Co Ltd v. Government of Malaysia, 1973).  
 
International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology 
Vol. 29, No. 6s, (2020), pp. 1688-1703 
 
1697 ISSN: 2005-4238 IJAST  
Copyright ⓒ 2020 SERSC 
 
 
In addition to the additional tax, IRBM may also impose a penalty if there is a failure to furnish a return 
within the stipulated period (Subsection 112(2) of ITA) or an incorrect return is furnished by the taxpayer 
or the taxpayer has given an incorrect information to the IRBM (Subsection 113(2) of ITA).  Based on an 
interview conducted by the author with the IRBM’s auditor, an audit finding may attract a penalty on the 
basis that the amount of tax payable as stated in the return furnished is lower than the amount of tax 
ascertained as a result of the audit. Thus, the return furnished is incorrect due to a difference in the 
amount of tax to be paid. For example, if in the original return furnished, the taxpayer self-assessed its 
liability at MYR 10 million(USD 2,392,716.93) and subsequent to an audit certain expenses are 
disallowed leading up to an additional tax of MYR 2 million (USD 477,725.23), the actual liability of the 
taxpayer is no longer MYR 10 million(USD 2,392,716.93) as declared in the return but has increased to 
MYR 12 million (USD 2,871,260.31). IRBM is of the view that the MYR 10 million (USD 2,392,716.93) 
disclosure originally made by the taxpayer in the return is incorrect thus warrants an imposition of 
penalties. 
 
OECD acknowledges the use of penalties to ensure compliance but emphasises the need for a fair and not 
burdensome regime. It is argued that a penalty regime that is too hard on taxpayers may distort the 
determination of taxable income between two jurisdictions. Therefore, OECD member states have agreed 
not to impose substantial penalties on taxpayers who have acted in good faith (OECD Model Tax 
Convention, 2012). Most countries apply general tax penalties to transfer pricing cases, but some 
countries have introduced specific transfer pricing penalties, especially in respect of documentation 




The relevant provision on the imposition of penalty in consequence of an audit adjustment, including 
transfer pricing audit, is subsection 113(2) of ITA. As such, the analysis that has been developed focuses 
primarily on the application of the said section. The landmark case on subsection 113(2) of ITAis the 
decision of the Supreme Court inKetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri v Kim Thye& Co [1992] 2 MLJ 
708.The Supreme Court held that subsection 113(2) is not a mandatory provision. The court ruled that 
subsection 113(2) clearly confers a discretion on the Director-General of Inland Revenue (DGIR) as to 
whether a penalty should be imposed or not. In exercising its discretion, the DGIR must take into account 
all factors and circumstances of the case and should not act mechanically.  
 
In the case of BR Sdn. Bhd. v. KetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri[2008] MSTC 3, 655,the DGIR had 
reduced the rate of the penalty of 60% from the additional tax payable, which is normally imposed on 
audit cases, to only 25%. The Special Commissioners of Income Tax (SCIT)was of the view that the 
DGIR has exercised its discretion correctly by reducing the penalty rate. The SCIT was satisfied that the 
Director-General had applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case in using his discretionary 
power, and there is no reason for them to interfere with the imposition of penalty. 
 
Under the current IRBM Audit Framework (2013), the penalty rate for audit cases is 45% of the tax or 
additional tax payable, while for transfer pricing audit cases the rate of penalty is only 25% of tax or 
additional tax payable (Transfer Pricing Audit Farmework 2013, para 26). Applying the reasoning in the 
BR SdnBhd’s case, it may be argued by the DGIR that he has applied his mindin exercising his discretion 
to impose penalty by not imposing the maximum penalty rate of 100% as provided under the ITA, but 
instead applying a lower rate of 45% or 25% respectively.  However, the opposing argument on the 
application of the framework by the IRBM’s auditor is that the auditor has acted mechanically by 
following the framework blatantly without considering other relevant facts of the case (ToxicolSdnBhd 
Appeal v. KPHDN,). 
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There are numerous recent cases where the courts were urged to decide on the issue of penalty. For 
instance, the High Court, in the case of Office Park Development SdnBhd v 
KetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri[2011] 9 MLJ 479, has set aside the penalty imposed by the DGIR. The 
High Court affirmed the SCIT’s decision to set aside the penalty under subsection 113(2) of the ITA on 
the basis that the taxpayer at all material times had acted in good faith, took professional advice, made full 
disclosure and that the matter in dispute arose as a result of a technical adjustment. It must be noted that 
the IRBM had withdrawn its appeal at the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High 
Court.Therefore, the principal of the case can be referred to by the tax payer to challenge any penalty 
imposed by IRBM. 
 
The consideration on whether a penalty should be imposed on technical adjustment was further confirmed 
in another High Court case of PiramidIntanSdnBhd v KetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri[2014] 1 LNS 
1468.In this case, it washeld that where the deduction made by the taxpayer was merely as a result of a 
technical adjustment made by the Respondent (DGIR), i.e., it is due to a differing interpretation of the tax 
legislation by the parties, the Court opined that penalty should not be imposed. 
 
In a nutshell, Office Park and PiramidIntan’s caseshaveput a burden for the DGIR to adduce evidence 
that the error made in return was not done in good faith or DGIR need to show a bad intention on the part 
of the taxpayer in preparing and submitting the return. Section 77 of ITA requires company to submit 
return of income to the DGIR seven months after the close of the accounting period.  DGIR will also face 
difficulties in maintaininga penalty imposed if a taxpayer is represented by a tax agent or tax 
professionalsas these are facts that support the element of good faith. There is a significant number of tax 
agents  beingappointed under Section 153 of ITA (List of Tax Agent as at July 2019) andmost companies 
or wealthy taxpayers are represented by tax advisers. Therefore, following the reasoning of the two cases 
above imposition of penalty by IRBM may not be sustained.The taxpayer may also be able to avoid 
paying penalty if, during the audit process, full cooperation is given, such as providing particulars or 
documents and answering all questions asked by the auditors (Kyros International SdnBhd v 
KetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri, 2013). 
 
In contrast to the above principles, there are decisions of the SCIT and courts that have taken a different 
approach in deciding on similar contentions or instances. For example, on the issue of technical 
adjustment, the SCIT in UCM S&S SdnBhd v KPHDN[2006] (Appeal No. PKCP(R) 37/2006),decided 
that technical adjustment argument is immaterial inimposition of penalty. The SCIT had adopted a strict 
approach and taken a stand that penalty is entirely the discretion of the DGIR.The SCIT took a similar 
stand in KT & Co v. KetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri(1996) MSTC 2594. The SCIT emphasised the 
importance of imposing penalty if there is an error made in the return. The imposition of penalty was held 
to be an essential part of assessment.A strict approach was preferred by the SCIT. 
 
A strict approach may be considered as consistent with the implementation of the self-assessment system 
where a taxpayer is required by law to determine his taxable income, compute his tax liability and submit 
his tax return. The tax computed is due to be paid on the due date and in the case of company seven 
months after the close of the accounting period (Section 77of ITA). Therefore, it is the duty of the 
taxpayer to ensure that they file a correct return or furnish the right information to the IRBM as the duty 
to ascertain and pay the tax is placed fully on the taxpayer. The validity of penalty imposed under the self-
assessment system was deliberated by the Court of Appeal in Syarikat PukinLadangKelapaSawitSdnBhd 
v KPHDN[2012] 6 MLJ 411, (Civil Appeal No. W-01-712-12/2011(COA), where High Court’s decision 
on  penalty is maintained having regard to the current self-assessment system and audit that has been 
carried out. The High Court agreed that in the self-assessment system, the duty is on the taxpayer to 
submit a correct return, and any error can only be discovered upon audit by the IRBM. The activity of 
audit by the IRBM was accepted as a basis to justify the imposition of penalty.The learned judge in the 
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above case has also considered the issue of “good faith” as a defence to the taxpayer. It was decided that 
good faith is only applicable if the taxpayer is being prosecuted for making an incorrect return.  
 
A similar decision was taken by another Court of Appeal in Syarikat Ibraco-PerembaSdnBhd v 
KetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri(Civil Appeal No. : W-01-177-04/2013)(COA).  In this case, the 
assessment was raised under section 140 of ITA where the DGIR had disregarded the transaction entered 
into by the taxpayer on the basis that it was part of a tax avoidance scheme. The learned Court of Appeal 
judge agreed that the avoidance scheme had been proven before the SCIT and on the issue of penalties the 
court held that the defence of good faith is only available to the taxpayer if the DGIR invokes or 
commences prosecution under subsection 113(1) of ITA. As such, the contention of good faith by the 
taxpayer with regards to imposition of penalty under subsection 113(2) of ITA was rejected. 
 
Finally, on the issue of good faith, the High Court in the case of KPHDN v NV Alliance[2009] (Civil 
Appeal No. R1-14-04-2009 (HC) and Court Appeal in Sri BinarayaSdnBhd v KPHDN[2016] MSTC 30-
130, (Civil Appeal No: W-01-448-10/2012 (COA)confirmed the High Court’s decision leading to good 
faith not being a shield against subsection 113(2) of the ITA.AbangIskandar Bin AbangHashim J, in the 
case of Sri BinarayaSdnBhd v KPHDN(2016)(Reported Judgment of the High Court) states as follows - 
 
“This Court is of the view that good faith is not an element that ought to feature and 
be considered, in cases of imposition of penalty by the KPHDN under Section 113(2) 
of the ITA, that could provide the taxpayer with the semblance of a shield of immunity 
against the imposition of such penalty. The language, as was employed in that 
subsection, as compared to the one immediately preceding it, would strongly convey 
the message that such has not been the intention of Parliament, namely that good 
faith is not a defence in a section 113(2) of the ITA.”(Emphasis added). 
 
For IRBM, the arguments of good faith as a defence for the taxpayer to set aside the penalty under 
subsection 113(2) of the ITA should no longer arise as recent decisions have decided otherwise. 
Nevertheless, since there is no clear higher court’s decision that has deliberated and held that Office 
Park’s case is wrongly decided, it is still open for the taxpayer to rely on or quote the grounds of 
judgement of the learned High Court judge in that case. Furthermore, except for Syarikat 
IbracoParemba’s case that involved a tax avoidance scheme, there are no grounds of judgement by the 
Court of Appeal in other cases. Without grounds of judgement of higher courts, it is not clear what are the 
basis or reasons for confirming or setting aside the imposition of penalty. Therefore, there is a need to 
provide a clear law on whether good faith can be a defence under subsection 113(2) of ITA or penalty 
maybe imposed on a strict liability basis. 
 
The imposition of penalty in a transfer pricing case was raised and decided in three SCIT rulings. The 
first reported case is the case of MM SdnBhd v KPHDN (2009)where the taxpayer argued that IRBM had 
conducted a transfer pricing audit on an arm’s length transaction based on the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
2003 wherein it has no legal effect and IRBM argued that the said guidelines take its cloth from the 
OECD model tax convention. The Court came to a conclusion among other issues that although IRBM 
had rejected the taxpayers comparable, the adjustment was done based on taxpayers comparable instead 
of IRBM’s own comparable. There is no appeal on this case. Because of the decision, the penalty was 
discharged by the SCIT. 
 
In another transfer pricing case of PGSB v DGIR [2013] (PKCP (R) 189-193/2013), IRBM’s conclusion 
that the dealings by the Company were not at arm’s length was argued as unreasonable and contrary to the 
functions, assets and risks and the accepted transfer pricing methodologies. The taxpayer objected to the 
imposition of penalty at 25%.  The taxpayer had argued that the transfer pricing documents comply with 
the Malaysian transfer pricing requirements in effect at that time.The taxpayer contended that, IRBM 
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failed to adhere to its own TP Guidelines 2003 and the OECD Guidelines 2010 by not producing a 
transfer pricing report to justify its characterization of normal distributor that is actually a full-fledged 
distributor under OECD Guidelines 2010. Further, IRBMfailed to consider the complexity of the 
marketing function of the Company and rejected the 22 comparables put forward by the taxpayer. The 
taxpayer also argued that notwithstanding the incorrect comparable selected, IRBM had misapplied the 
OECD Guidelines and should have made capital adjustments and not adjusted to the median and failed to 
take into account the other functions carried out by the 5 comparable companies. IRBM argued that the 
TP Guidelines 2003 is premised on the OECD TP Guidelines 2010 (OECD TP Guidelines 2010, para 3.4) 
thus in absence of any guidelines on a specific area, the OECD TP Guidelines will be utilised. IRBM had 
reviewed all TP documents filed by the taxpayer and provided explanations on the adjustment made and 
OECD TP Guidelines enable adjustment of price in controlled transaction to median range due to 
defective comparability (OECD TP Guidelines 2010, para 3.57). IRBM had chosen the 5 comparables 
after making an analysis of 22 comparable companies chosen by the taxpayer, and each activity of each 
comparable companies had been considered. The taxpayer argued that they did not submit incorrect return 
nor gave incorrect information and had also sought professional advice. The Court found that IRBM’s 
conclusion that the controlled transactions are not at arm’s length was wrong and as such the penalty was 
set aside. 
 
The most recent decision of the SCIT is the case of OM (M) SdnBhd[2012] (PKCP (R) 189-192/2012) 
that hinges on section 140 of the ITA, the general anti-avoidance provision. The Court concluded that 
based on subsection 140(6) of the ITA, IRBM is responsible for proving that the controlled transactions 
are not at arm’s length. The methodology in determining arm’s length transactions, which was by way of 
Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method,was correct.CUP, is a method accepted by the IRBM in 
ascertaining arm’s length price under the TP Guidelines 2003. The audit done by IRBM was based on the 
TP Guidelines 2003 which hadbeen argued as not having any legal effect.The adjustment had been done 
arbitrarily in view that the purchase with its related Company is indeed at the same price or lower 
compared with purchased   from independent company. The taxpayer’s CUP method is more suitable than 
Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) applied by the IRBM despite thatTNMM is also a method 
accepted by the IRBM in ascertaining arm’s length price under the TP Guidelines 2003.The taxpayer 
argued that they were not given the opportunity to address the penalty imposed under subsection 113(2) 
of the ITA and that section 140 of the ITA did not provide for imposition of a penalty. Nevertheless, the 
crucial arguments raised by the taxpayer is that they had acted in good faith and there was no incorrect 
return filed, all had been duly furnished with honesty, full cooperation had been given and professional 
advice had been obtained. The appeal by the tax payer was allowed and the penalty imposed was set aside 
by the SCIT. 
 
Without a doubt, there are many cases on imposition of penalty either decided in favour of the taxpayer or 
IRBM. The courts have taken various approaches in confirming or rejecting the penalty that was imposed. 
To add to the uncertainty, except for IbracoParemba’s case, there are no written grounds given by the 
higher court, in particular,the Court of Appeal on this issue. As such, there is no clear direction to the 
public or tax practitioners on these aspects of the law. Furthermore, there is no specific penalty case on 
transfer pricing that has been decided by the higher court. More so, there is no special penalty provision 
for transfer pricing cases. IRBM has over the years relied on subsection 113(2) of ITA, the general 
penalty provision in raising a transfer pricing assessment. Indeed, thelower penalty rate on transfer pricing 
cases is not the right solution given the cases discussed above. In short, the same argument or issue would 
continuously be raised by the taxpayer when penalty is imposed upon the determination of a transfer 
pricing audit. 
 
It has been contended that penalty is the discretion of the Revenue, and it should not be exercised at whim 
and fancy. The Revenue must consider all relevant facts and circumstances of each case (Kim Thye Co. v. 
KetuaPengarahJabatanHasilDalamNegeri, Kuala Lumpur, 1991).  There have been times when the 
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taxpayer had been successful in setting aside a penalty imposed on the ground that they have acted in 
good faith in submitting the return and had obtained professional advice in preparing the return(Office 
Park Development SdnBhd v KetuaPengarahHasilDalamNegeri, 2011).  In contrast, the Revenuetakes the 
stand that good faith is not a defence available for the tax payer under subsection 113 (2) of the ITA and 
good faith is only relevant as a defence in a prosecution conducted under subsection 113(1) of the 
ITA(Syarikat Ibraco – ParembaSdnBhd v KPHDN, 2013). 
 
It is trite law that IRBM must establish the above ingredients which were set out in Kim Thye’scase, i.e. 
that the incorrect return or information was given dishonestly with an intention to evade tax or possibly 
fraud (negligently)  upon the standard of beyond reasonable doubt at that material time. Even if section 
140 of ITA was applicable, the procedure adopted by the IRBM in automatically imposed penalties is 
mechanical, unreasonable and illegal(DGIR v Shell Refining Company (Federation of Malaya) Berhad, 
2013 and DGIR v Kok Fai Yin Co. Sdn. Bhd, 1990). 
 
The imposition of penalty by IRBM’s audit team is based on the Audit Framework issued to the public. In 
practice then all transfer pricing cases will be subjected to imposition of penalty without considering the 
relevant facts and circumstances of the case. Such conduct amounts to a mechanical decision making, 
which can be easily challenged in a court of law.   
 
It has been argued that in transfer pricing cases brought to the courts, there has been no finding that the 
Company has not given full co-operation to IRBM in disclosing all information requested by IRBM. They 
have acted in good faith throughout the entire field audit and did not, in any way, try to withhold any 
information from the IRBM. This is clear from the audit report prepared by the IRBM’s audit team.  
 
It is also pertinent to note that there is no specific penalty provision in the ITA to address transfer pricing 
adjustment. The reliance on good faith as a defence against a penalty imposed undersubsection 113(2) of 
ITA would lead to having to adduce evidence of bad faith on the part of the taxpayer thus creating an 
onerous burden for the IRBM, more so when the taxpayer has prepared transfer pricing documents as 
requested by the IRBM. The analysis carried out in transfer pricing case is very subjective as it depends 
on the evidence from other parties or entities carrying out similar activities. It is finally purely a question 
of facts that could be open for various interpretations.   
 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Transfer pricing is an important international tax issue. In Malaysia, IRBM like every tax authority 
around the world have issued guidelines and laws to address profit shifting issue of multinationals. The 
first guidelines on transfer pricing were issued in 2003. The guidelines were published based on section 
140 of the ITA, the general anti-avoidance provision. A new and specific transfer pricing law was 
introduced in 2009, followed by new Rules and Guidelines. 
 
Adjustments raised by IRBMhave been disputed before the SCIT and courts on numerous grounds.The 
IRBM must have clear authority to make transfer pricing adjustments. Any ambiguity or doubt in the law 
will be interpreted in favour of the taxpayer (National Land Finance Co-Operative Society Ltd v Director 
General of Inland Revenue, 1993).The imposition of penalty arising from transfer pricing audit is one of 
the areas where there is a need to provide for a clear law. This is so having regard to various inconsistent 
judgements and rulings by the SCIT and courts on the application of subsection 113(2) of ITA. More so 
when there is no specific provision on penalty for transfer pricing cases despite the introduction of a 
specific provision to address the problem of transfer pricing.  
 
A clear law on the imposition of penalty will not only protect the interest of the government but will also 
assist the taxpayer to comply with the law, especially in the era of self-assessment. The study’s findings 
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and recommendations should help refocus the attention of Malaysia’s lawmakers in creating a 
comprehensive transfer pricing legislation. Furthermore, in line with having specifictransfer pricing 
provisions, the general imposition of penalty needs to be revisited.Specific and clear provisions for the 
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